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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAws-RAcIAL SEGREGATION IN PuBLIC EnuCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS-Segregation of races, particularly separation
of white and colored races, has long been condoned by American
courts as permissible under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Underlying the traditional view is the
idea that the equal protection clause is not violated by segregation so
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long as equal facilities are provided for both races.1 On this basic
premise a large number of jurisdictions, particularly the southern
states, have predicated constitutional provisions and statutory enactments compelling racial segregation,2 while a number of other states
where segregation has not been forbidden by express constitutional or
statutory provision have achieved the same practical result,~ The possibility that the Supreme Court of the United States may hive occasion
to pass- on the validity of the basic a~suinption 4 makes it desirable to
review in some detail the attitude of the courts toward this problem.
l

The first consideration is the basis of the assumed premise that
segregation is constitutional where equal facilities are provided. Perhaps the earliest enunciation of the doctrine occurred in the dictum of
the United States Supreme Court in the case of Hall 'V. De Cuir. 5
The case involved a public carrier, but the court stated obiter that
segregation in public schools did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment if equal facilities were provided. A federal court in an early
case actually involving segregation in public schools followed the cue
suggested by the dictum of the Hall case.6 In 1889 the United States
Supreme Court was presented with a case arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment and dealing with compulsory segregation of white and
negro children in public schools, but "it refused to consider the question
because it was not properly before the court.7 Again by way of dictum
in Plessy 'V. Ferguson 8 the United· States Supreme Court reiterated
the "equal facilities" doctrine. Meanwhile, many state courts as well
as lower federal courts followed the lead and proclaimed the legality
of segregation in public schools.9 Finally, in 1927, the Supreme Court
See United States Const., Four.teenth Amendment.
Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Missisippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia, all practice compulsory segregation,
twelve of them by virtue of constitutional provision. The Alabama Constitution, Art.
XIV, § 256, and the Alabama statute, Ala. Code (1940) tit. 52, § 93 are representative. "For a survey and discussion see STEPHENSON, RAcE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN
I.Aw 170 et seq. (1910).
'
8 See Payne, "Negroes in the Public Elementary School of the North," 140
ANNALS 224 at 227 (1928).
4 See Part 2 of this comment for a discussion of current cases.
5 95 U.S. 485 (1877).
6 United St_ates v. Buntin, (C.C. Ohio 1882) 10 F. 730.
7 Cumming v. Richmond County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528, 20 S.Ct.
197 (1899).
8 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. II38 (1896).
9 State v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 at 209 (1871); Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal.
36 at 49 (1874); Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 at 344 (1874); Lehew v. Brummell,
1

2
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was confronted with the question in the case of Gong Lum v. Rice.10
It was argued there that to compel a full-blooded Chinese school child
to attend a school for colored children violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court tacitly asumed the basic premise and held that the
equal protection clause was not violated; it refused to consider the
issue of the constitutionality of segregation per se in view of the Cummings and Plessy cases. Later, in the case of Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada,11 the Court held that a state does not discharge its obligation
to provide equal educational facilities by offering to pay the tuition
of a colored student in an out-of-state law school. Thus, up to now
the Supreme Court has not squarely considered the basic question of
the validity of _racial segregation in public education institutions in the
light of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2

There are, however, a number of very recent cases involving the
question of racial segregation in public schools that may well force a
reconsideration of the whole problem. A radical departure from the
tacit assumption of the legality of racial segregation was express~d by
the federal district court for the southern district of California in
Mendez v. Westminster School District.12 Judge McCormick there
said: "The equal protection of the laws pertaining to the public school
system in California is not provided by furnishing in separate schools
the same technical facilities, text books, and courses of instruction....
A paramount requisite in the American system of public education is
social equality. It must be open to all children by unified school association regardles~ of lineage." 18 The circuit court of appeals affirmed 14 but preferred to avoid the basic constitutional question, and
based its decision entirely on the violation of a California statute restricting segregation.111
•
103 Mo. 546, 15 S.W. 765 (1891); Bluford v. Canada, (D.C. Mo. 1940). 32 F.
Supp. 707; State ex rel. Michael v. Witham, 179 Tenn. 250, 165 S.W. (2d) 378
(1942). See also United States Const., Fourteenth Amendment. On the subject
generally see comments in 82 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 157 (1933) and 30 MINN. L. REv.
-219 at 254, 271, 282 (1946).
10 275 U.S. 78, 48 S.Ct. 91 (1927).
11 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232 (1938). For the final outcome of the case see
344 Mo. 1238, 131 S.W. (2d) 217 (1939), noted in 13 So. CAL. L. REv. 68
(1939). A similar result was reached in Pearson v. Murray, (Md. 1936) 182 A.
590; 20 MINN. L. REv. 673 (1936); 45 YALE L. J. 1296 (1936).
12 (D.C. Cal. 1946) 64 F. Supp. 544, 47 CoL. L. REV. 325 (1947).
18 (D.C. Cal. 1946) 64 F. Supp. 544 at 549.
.
14 (C.C.A. 9th, 1947) 161 F. (2d) 774; 56 YALE L. J. 1059 (1947); 30
MINN. L. REV. 646 (1946).
15 According to a letter from National Association for Advancement of Colored
People, Dec. 8, 1947, the case has not been appealed.
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The question has similarly been raised in South Carolina by the
case of Wrighten v. Board of Trustees,16 where the issue was presented
by a negro student desiring to enter the law school of the University
of South Carolina. The state provided no facilities for legal education of colored students, but the cow::t was willing to allow the state
time to establish a law school and conditioned its decree on that event.
The other alternatives given the state by the decree were to discontinue
all legal education, or to accept Wrighten in the existing white law
school.11 The court squarely held that segregation according to race
was not an unreasonable classification under the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, and was therefore permissible"
Two cases have arisen in Louisiana raising the segregation issue:
Johnson v. Louisiana State University, and Hatfield v. Louisiana State
University, the former cpncerned with the medical school and the
latter with the law school. These cases have not yet been tried.18 Likewise in Texas the case of Heman Marion Sweatt v. Members of the
Board of Regents of the University of Texas has raised the issue.19
Finally, in the case of Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the University
of Oklahotna 20 the Supreme Court of Oklahoma upheld segregation,
claiming that the Fourteenth Amendment is not violated by denial
of entry to a colored student to the law school where no separate
facilities for legal education of colored students are provided unless
and until the student has made his wants and desires known to the
proper authorities. It thus attempted to qualify t}ie Gaines case.21 On
writ of certiorari the Supreme Court of the United States reversed
this decision in an opinion handed down January 12, 1948.22 The court
in a brief per curiam opinion, however, ignored the fundamental question of the validity of segregation and based its decision solely on the
Gaines case,28 adding as the only qualification that equal facilities must
be provided as promptly for the petitioner as they are for applicants
of any other group. Thus again the Supreme Court has left the funda(D.C. S.C. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 948.
No appeal has been taken from this order. South Carolina has set up a law
school of sorts, according to a letter from N.A.A.C.P., Dec. 8, 1947.
' 18 Letter, N.A.A.C.P., Dec. 8, 1947.
.
19 There have been two appeals, the first of which was decided Marcli 26, 1947,
by the Court of Civil Appeals for the Third Judicial District of Texas and was remanded to the District Court of Travis County for trial on the issue of the illegality
of segregation. The trial was held in May, 1947, and the case is now on appeal again
to the same Court of Civil Appeals.-Letter from N.A.A.C.P., Dec. 8, 1947.
20 (Okla. 1947) 180 P. (2d) 135.
21 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232 (1938).
22 (U.S. 1948) 68 S.Ct. 299.
28 305 U.S. 337, 59 S.Ct. 232 (1938).
16
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mental question unanswered. If this attitude is to be continued, it is
apparent that it will be very difficult to present a case which will decide the issue, since the states which compel segregation are the very
states least likely to provide facilities which will meet the equality
test. Thus the Supreme Court will always be able to avoid the fundamental question by finding that the facilities provided colored students
are not in fact adequate or equal.24
3
As previously pointed out, the question of the validity of segregation by race in public educational institutions is still unanswered
insofar as a direct decision by the Supreme Court of the United States
is concerned. As new cases arise in that court, it will be faced with
three possible alternatives. First, it can avoid this constitutional issue
if possible. This alternative, of course, accords with the often repeated
but frequently violated rule of declining to decide particular constitutional issues unless necessary to the decision of the case.25 Secondly,
it can resolve the question by deciding that racial segregation is per..:
missible under the Fourteenth Amendment if equal facilities are provided. Or thirdly, it may decide that racial segregation per se violates
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Insofar as
the latter two alternatives are concerned, the only possible arguments
for the separate but equal facilities view are, first, adherence to dicta
or assumption of previous cases as a matter of precedent, especially
since many lower federal courts, as well as state courts, have adhered
24 On January 17, 1948, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma issued an order
directing the trial court to take such proceedings as might be necessary to carry out
the mandate of the Supreme Court of the United States. The trial court entered
an order directing the Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education to ( 1) enroll
plaintiff in the first year class at the School of Law of the University of Oklahoma,
or (2) admit no students to that first year class until a separate and substantially equal
school of law for negroes should be established, but if such separate school should be
established then not to enroll plaintiff in the University of Oklahoma. The regents
claimed to have set up a separate school as required. Plaintiff did not attend but
rather petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of mandamus
to compel compliance with the mandate of January 12, 1948. The petition was
denied on February 16, 1948, Fisher v. Hurst, (U.S. 1948) Adv. Op. The court
held that the original petition for certiorari did not present the question whether a
state could satisfy the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by establishing
a separate law school for negroes, and remanded the petition to the trial court for a
determination of any proceedings arising under its order. Justice Murphy thought
that evidence should have been heard as to whether the Oklahoma court's decision
constituted an evasion of the mandate. Justice Rutledge dissented, asserting that the
action of the Oklahoma courts was inconsistent with the mandate on its face.
25 Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283 at 295, 25 S.Ct. 243 (1905).
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to the separate but equal facilities doctrine; and, secondly, the possible
social effects which repudiation of the doctrine may have in areas now
practicing segregation. The very weakness of these arguments is doubtless a compelling reason for avoidance of a decision on the issue at all,
since in the absence of a repudiation of the separate but equal facilities
doctrine, the status quo may be retained even though the plight of the
race discriminated against may still be alleviated by stricter insistence
on truly equal facilities. Indeed, the trend of the cases has been to
tighten the requirements of an equal facility. 26 This course inevitably
will involve the Supreme Court in a determination of what constitutes
an equal facility, 21 a problem which will undoubtedly arise more and
more frequently in the future. On the other hand, a decision that the
equal protection clause is not satisfied by equal but separate facilities
will bring this field of the law more in accord with the pronounced
attitude of the Court in finding racial discrimination unconstitutional
in oth~r situations, for example, segregation in' interstate transportation,28 exclusion of negroes from jury service,2° differentials in salaries
of white and negro public school teachers,so residential segregation
prescribed by state legislation or municipal ordinance.31
Finally, it can hardly be denied that the facilities afforded the
minority race are seldom in fact equal and almost always result in discrimination. Gunnar Myrdal sums up the problem in these words:
" ••• Negroes to get equal accommodations, but separate
from the whites. It is evident, however, and rarely denied, that
there is practically no single instance of segregation in the South
which has not been utilized for a significant discrimination. The
great difference in quality of service for the two groups in the
segregated set-ups for transportation and education is merely the
most obvious example of how segregation is an excuse for discrimination." 82
26 For example see Jones v. Newlon, 81 Colo. 25, 253 P. 386 (1927); Patterson
v. Board of Education, II N.J. Misc. 179, 164 A. 892 (1933), affd., II2 N.J.L.
99, 169 A. 690 (1934); Jones v. Board of Education, 90 Okla. 233, 217 P. 400
(1923). See also the note in 103 A.L.R. 713 (1936).
21 It is nor the purpose of the writer to go into this question here. An excellent
annotation may be found on this point in 103 A.L.R. 713 (1936).
28 Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U.S. 373, 66 S.Ct. 1050 (1946).
29 Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 20 S.Ct. 687 (1900); Smith v~ Texas, 3u
U.S. 128, 61 S.Ct~ 164 (1940); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 62 S.Ct. 1159 (1942).
so Alston v. School Board, (C.C.A. 4th, 1940) II2 F. (2d) 992, cert. den.,
3II U.S. 693, 61 S.Ct. 75 (1940).
..
81 Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668, 47 S.Ct. 471 (1927); Buchanan v. Warley,
245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16 (1917); Richmond v. Deans, (C.C.A. 4th, 1930) 37 F.
(2d) 712, affd., 281 U.S. 704, 50 S.Ct. 407 (1930).
82 7 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 581 (1944).
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Various statistical studies would appear to bear out these assertions.38 Thus in making a decision on this point the Supreme Court
can hardly allow itself to -ignore the fact that the separate but equal
facilities doctrine does not in practice prevent racial discrimination.
Neal Seegert, S.Ed.

88 See BLOSE and CAILVER,

STATISTICS OF THE EDUCATION OF NEGROES

6, Table

8 (1944). For further material, see 56 YALE L. J. 1059 at 1062 (1947), and 14
J. OF NEGRO EDUCATION 509 et seq. (1945); 15 id. 263 et seq. (1946); 16 id.

